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abstract: Hamilton’s haplodiploidy hypothesis suggests that the
relatively higher relatedness of full sisters in haplodiploid populations
promotes altruistic sib rearing and, consequently, the evolution of
eusociality. This haplodiploidy effect works when some broods have
a relatively female-biased sex ratio and other broods have a relatively
male-biased sex ratio, termed split sex ratios. There is empirical
evidence for two scenarios having potentially led to split sex ratios
en route to eusociality: unmated queens and queen replacement. A
recent analysis of these two scenarios has suggested that haplodip-
loidy can either promote or inhibit the evolution of eusociality and
that the effect is usually small. However, this work made the sim-
plifying assumptions that there is only negligible reproduction by
workers and that their offspring have the same sex ratio as those
produced by the queen. Here, we relax these assumptions and find
that worker reproduction has a negative influence on the evolution
of helping, either reducing the extent to which it is promoted or
leading to it being inhibited. This is particularly so when workers
are unmated and hence constrained to produce only sons, by ar-
rhenotoky. Overall, when parameterized with empirical data, our
results suggest that split sex ratios in haplodiploid species have not
played an important role in facilitating the evolution of eusociality.
Keywords: altruism, helping, inclusive fitness, kin selection, monog-
amy, sex allocation.
Introduction
Eusociality is characterized by the presence of a caste of less
reproductive individuals that develops specialized adapta-
tions for helping a caste of more reproductive individuals
to reproduce (Crespi and Yanega 1995). Obligate eusociality
is characterized by complementary totipotency, such that
the presence of both reproductive and nonreproductive
castes is required in order for the colony to achieve suc-
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cessful reproduction (Michener 1974; Crespi and Yanega
1995; Boomsma 2007, 2009). While elaborated forms of
sociality with specialization into castes has emerged in sev-
eral taxa—soldier aphids (Aoki 1977; Ito 1989), gall-forming
thrips (Crespi 1992), snapping shrimps (Duffy 1996), platy-
podid beetles (Kent and Simpson 1992), and naked mole
rats (Jarvis 1981)—obligate eusociality is found only in the
social Hymenoptera (bees, ants, and wasps; Wilson 1971;
Boomsma 2007, 2009) and the social cockroaches (termites;
Thorne 1997; Inward et al. 2007). These groups have
achieved remarkable ecological success, with ants and ter-
mites together accounting for more than half of all insect
biomass (Ho¨lldobler and Wilson 1990).
The problem of eusociality is to explain why individuals
altruistically give up their ability to reproduce in order to
help others achieve reproductive success (Hamilton 1964a,
1964b, 1972). Hamilton’s (1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1970) theory
of inclusive fitness reveals that by helping a relative to re-
produce, an individual is able to transmit copies of his or
her own genes to future generations, albeit indirectly. If this
indirect route to genetic success outweighs the loss of direct
genetic success via the individual’s own reproduction, then
altruistic helping is favored by natural selection. Hamilton
(1964a, 1964b, 1972) noted that haplodiploid sex deter-
mination, whereby fertilized eggs develop into (diploid) fe-
males and unfertilized eggs develop into (haploid) males,
leads to a female being more related to her full sisters (life-
for-life relatedness , assuming outbreeding and anR p 3/4F
even sex ratio; table 1) than to her own daughters (R pD
) and suggested that this explains the apparent prepon-1/2
derance of haplodiploidy among eusocial taxa. However,
haplodiploidy also leads a female to be less related to her
brothers ( ) than to her sons ( ), whichR p 1/4 R p 1/2M S
counteracts the inclusive fitness benefit of sib rearing (Ham-
ilton 1964b, 1972). It is easy to see that these two effects of
haplodiploidy exactly cancel when there is an even sex ratio,
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Table 1: Summary of model notation used in this article
Symbol Definition
m Proportion of colony’s offspring derived from workers
u Proportion of colonies founded by unmated queens (queen virginity model)
a Relative productive of colonies founded by unmated queens (queen virginity model)
q Probability of queen survival (queen replacement model)
f Probability that two maternal sisters share the same father
Ni Number of individuals from class in the populationi  {m, f}
m Male
f Female
cm Class reproductive value of males
cf Class reproductive value of females
vm Reproductive value of a male ( )¯c /zm
vf Reproductive value of a female ( )¯c /(1  z)f
px Consanguinity between a focal worker and an individual of role x  {D, S, F, M, Ni, Ne}
Rx Life-for-life relatedness of individual from the perspective of a focalx  {D, S, F, M, Ni, Ne}
worker, that is, (px/p) # , where is the individual’s sex and p is the con-(v /v ) i  {m, f}i f
sanguinity of the worker to herself
D Daughter
S Son
F Sister
M Brother
Ni Niece
Ne Nephew
wi Fitness of individual of sex i  {m, f}
w¯i Average fitness of individual of sex i  {m, f}
zC Sex ratio of the focal worker’s colony
zQ Sex ratio of queen-derived offspring
zO Sex ratio of worker-derived offspring
zM Sex ratio of queen-derived offspring in mated-queen colonies (queen virginity model)
zR Sex ratio of queen-derived offspring in queenright colonies (queen replacement model)
zL Sex ratio of queen-derived offspring in queenless colonies (queen replacement model)
z¯ Sex ratio of the population
as here the average relatedness of siblings (1/2 # 3/4 
) is the same as the average relatedness of1/2 # 1/4 p 1/2
offspring ( ; Trivers and Hare1/2 # 1/2  1/2 # 1/2 p 1/2
1976). This exact canceling also occurs under female-biased
sex allocation (Craig 1979) because the increased genetic
similarity to siblings is exactly counteracted by the increased
reproductive value of males, owing to their being the rarer
sex (Fisher 1930).
One possibility for rescuing the haplodiploidy hypoth-
esis involves split sex ratios, whereby there is a greater
female bias among a potential altruist’s siblings than in
the population as a whole (Trivers and Hare 1976; Seger
1983; Grafen 1986). This allows the potential altruist to
enjoy the benefit of close genetic similarity to her siblings
(because they are primarily sisters) without the concom-
itant reduction in the reproductive value of females (be-
cause the population sex ratio need not be as biased;
Boomsma and Grafen 1990, 1991; Boomsma 1991). Split
sex ratios may be favored for a number of reasons and
have been found in natural populations (Boomsma 1991;
Mueller 1991; Meunier et al. 2008; West 2009). However,
a limited number of mechanisms could have led to split
sex ratios during the evolution of eusociality, and previous
theoretical work has tended to focus on relatively general
models that ask the qualitative question of whether hap-
lodiploidy can promote altruistic sib rearing rather than
examining how much haplodiploidy is likely to have mat-
tered (reviewed in Gardner et al. 2012). Consequently,
there is a need for more specific models that examine the
biologically most relevant scenarios, capturing all the ef-
fects of biased sex allocation on the reproductive value of
females and males, and that ask the quantitative question
of how much haplodiploidy promotes helping.
Gardner et al. (2012) examined the impact of split sex
ratios on the origin and elaboration of altruistic helping
in haplodiploid populations. Of the possible mechanisms
that could lead to split sex ratios, several lack empirical
support or have arisen only after advanced eusociality had
already evolved (Gardner et al. 2012). Consequently, there
are only two mechanisms for stable split sex ratios for
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which there is empirical evidence that they could have
played a role en route to eusociality: queen virginity and
queen replacement (Packer 1986; Godfray 1988; Yanega
1989; Boomsma 1991; Mueller 1991; Godfray and Hardy
1993; Kranz et al. 2000; Gardner et al. 2012). Analyzing
these two cases, Gardner et al. (2012) showed that the
haplodiploidy effect may promote or inhibit the evolution
of altruistic helping, depending on whether helping is fac-
ultatively adjusted according to the sex allocation of the
individual’s colony, and also that the haplodiploidy effect
tends to be small.
However, Gardner et al. (2012) examined the best-case
scenarios for haplodiploidy to promote the evolution of
eusociality and so made two restrictive assumptions. First,
they assumed that there is negligible reproduction by
workers within the colony. In reality, worker reproduction
is significant in haplodiploid species, and conflict over
male parentage is almost universal (Ratnieks et al. 2006).
In a comparative analysis of 90 species of bees, wasps, and
ants, Wenseleers and Ratnieks (2006) found that worker
reproduction accounts for 0%–100% of the offspring pro-
duced in colonies, with a mean of 12%. This reduces the
relatedness of workers to the offspring that they would
help to raise (nieces and nephews rather than siblings) and
hence would appear to reduce selection for helping. Sec-
ond, building on the model of Craig (1979), Gardner et
al. (2012) assumed that (rare) worker-produced offspring
have the same sex ratio as do the offspring produced by
the queen. In reality, workers of many species are unmated
and hence able to produce only sons (Fletcher and Ross
1985; Bourke 1988; Ratnieks et al. 2006; Wenseleers and
Ratnieks 2006). When there is a female-biased sex allo-
cation at the population level, this increases the relative
reproductive value of males and hence would appear to
also reduce selection for helping.
Here, we extend Gardner et al.’s (2012) analysis to in-
vestigate the impact of relaxing these two restrictive as-
sumptions. Specifically, we explore the consequences of
allowing worker-produced offspring (1) to represent a sig-
nificant fraction of the colony’s reproductive success and
(2) to have a sex ratio different from that of the queen-
produced offspring. Following Gardner et al. (2012), we
consider that the worker class has already evolved and thus
determine the extent to which natural selection favors fur-
ther elaboration of the helping undertaken by these work-
ers. We consider helping that is either obligately expressed
in all colonies in which workers occur or else facultatively
adjusted according to the sex ratio of the worker’s colony.
We examine the two biologically relevant scenarios for
stable split sex ratios: queen virginity and queen replace-
ment. In each case we determine the potential for altruistic
helping, which we compare with that obtained under dip-
loidy, in order to assess whether, when, and to what extent
haplodiploidy promotes eusociality.
General Methods
We consider a newly eclosed female who is choosing be-
tween helping her mother rear the colony’s juveniles and
producing her own offspring within the same colony. We
assume that each colony contains one queen who, if mated,
produces a cohort of female workers, followed by a cohort
of reproductive juveniles of both sexes that the workers
help to rear, with successfully reared reproductives leaving
the colony to mate at random within the entire population
(i.e., no inbreeding). We denote the probability that two
maternal sisters share the same father by f. Throughout
this article, we present general results that allow for both
single and multiple mating ( ) but give special0 ≤ f ≤ 1
attention to the predictions for monogamy ( ). Wef p 1
focus on monogamy because (i) there is empirical support
for eusociality to have evolved only in monogamous pop-
ulations (Boomsma 2007, 2009, 2013; Hughes et al. 2008)
and (ii) monogamy increases the genetic relatedness be-
tween a worker and the juveniles in her colony, consti-
tuting a best-case scenario for the evolution of eusociality
(Boomsma 2007, 2009, 2013; Hughes et al. 2008). We as-
sume that a proportion m of the colony’s reproductive
offspring are derived from the workers and derive1  m
from the queen. We assume worker control of the sex ratio
of those offspring derived from the queen, and we denote
the sex ratio (proportion male) of the queen-derived off-
spring by zQ and that of the worker-derived offspring by
zO.
We consider two scenarios for worker reproduction. In
the first scenario, we assume that each worker is able to
mate and that her offspring have the same sex ratio as do
those of the queen ( ), under the control of thez p zO Q
other workers. In the second scenario, we assume that work-
ers do not mate and thus produce only male offspring
( ). This allows us to investigate the relaxation ofz p 1O
Gardner et al.’s (2012) key assumptions—negligible worker
reproduction and equal sex ratio for queen-derived and
worker-derived offspring—both independently and also in
conjunction. Throughout our analysis, we assume that col-
onies containing workers have them in sufficiently large
numbers that from a focal worker’s perspective, the colony’s
reproductive offspring that she may altruistically rear con-
sists of a mixture of siblings and nieces/nephews, with her
own sons/daughters comprising only a negligible fraction
of these offspring. Relaxing this assumption would promote
the evolution of helping, for the simple reason that some
of the recipients of helping would be the worker’s own
offspring.
In both scenarios, workers manipulate the sex ratio of
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the queen’s offspring but through different mechanisms.
In the first scenario, we consider that both queen and
workers produce male and female eggs and it is the work-
ers’ decision, as a group, that determines the proportion
of male and female juveniles that will be raised to adult-
hood. Thus, the sex ratios of queen-produced and worker-
produced offspring are the same as the colony’s sex ratio
( ). We model this scenario using a neighbor-z p z p zO Q C
modulated (personal) fitness approach (Taylor 1996; Tay-
lor and Frank 1996; Frank 1997, 1998; Rousset 2004; Taylor
et al. 2007) to determine the effect of a gene expressed by
workers and controlling the sex ratio of the colony’s off-
spring, zC. In the second scenario, we consider that workers
cannot adjust the sex of their own offspring (they are all
males; ) but that they can manipulate the sex ratioz p 1O
of the queen-produced offspring ( ). In this case,0 ≤ z ≤ 1Q
we use a neighbor-modulated fitness approach to deter-
mine the effect of a gene expressed by workers and con-
trolling for the sex ratio of queen-produced offspring, zQ.
Notice that in this second scenario, workers are producing
only sons and thus the sex ratio of the colony’s juveniles
will be more male biased than the offspring of the queen
( ).z p (1  m)z  m ≥ zC Q Q
We then take an inclusive fitness approach (Hamilton
1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1970, 1972) to determine the value
that a female worker places on her own offspring versus
those of her colony. In the first case, the average value of
the worker’s offspring is , wherez v p  (1  z )v p vO m S O f D f
and are the reproductive values of a female and a malevm
(see app. A for derivation), respectively, and pD and pS are
the consanguinities between a focal worker and her daugh-
ters and her sons, respectively (see app. B for derivation).
The average value of the colony’s offspring can be written
as , where pf and pm are the averagez v p  (1  z )v pC m m C f f
consanguinities between a focal worker and a random fe-
male juvenile and a random male juvenile, respectively, in
their colony. Helping to rear b of the colony’s juveniles at
a loss of c of her own offspring is favored by natural
selection if this increases the worker’s inclusive fitness, that
is, if .b[z v p  (1  z )v p ] 1 c[z v p  (1  z )v p ]C m m C f f O m S O f D
We may rewrite this condition as , wherec/b ! a
z v p  (1  z )v pC m m C f f
a p (1)
z v p  (1  z )v pO m S O f D
is the potential for helping and represents the threshold
cost/benefit ratio at which the worker is indifferent be-
tween helping to rear the colony’s juveniles and producing
her own offspring (Charnov 1978; Grafen 1986; Gardner
et al. 2012). We say that haplodiploidy promotes altruistic
helping if and that haplodiploidy inhibits altruistica 1 1
helping if , as represents the best-case scenarioa ! 1 a p 1
for a diploid, outbred, fully monogamous population
(Gardner et al. 2012). This framework holds for both all-
or-nothing helping (i.e., all individuals choosing to de-
velop as workers are completely sterile) and a continuum
between the extremes of only helping and only reproduc-
ing (i.e., individuals choose to help a bit more versus a
bit less). We summarize model notation in table 1.
Queen Virginity
In this section, we investigate the impact of haplodiploidy
on the potential for altruistic helping in the context of
split sex ratios due to queen virginity. We consider a pop-
ulation composed of a large number of colonies, each
founded by a single queen. We assume that a proportion
u of queens are unmated and hence produce only sons,
whereas the remaining proportion of queens are1  u
mated and produce both sons and daughters, including
female workers. We denote by zM the sex ratio of the re-
productive offspring produced by mated queens. As un-
mated-queen colonies do not have workers, we assume
that their productivity is a proportion of the0 ≤ a ≤ 1
productivity of the mated-queen colonies (Gardner et al.
2012). As workers are present only in mated-queen col-
onies and therefore help at only one type of colony, there
is no useful distinction between helping that is obligate
and helping that is facultative in response to colony type.
Mated Workers
We extend the queen virginity model presented by Gardner
et al. (2012) by allowing workers to produce a significant
share of the colony’s offspring. We assume that workers are
mated by unrelated males from their fathers’ generation and
that their offspring have the same sex ratio as the queen-
derived offspring in their colony ( ).z p z p zO M C
We find that the convergence stable sex ratio strategy
(Taylor 1996; Taylor and Frank 1996) for colonies with
workers is given by
4  m[m  2(2  m)f]  m{2a(2  m)(1  2f)  (2  m)[2  m(1  2f)]}
z¯ pC
4(1  u){2  m  [2  (1  m)m]f}
(2a)
if u ≤ {(2  m)[2  m(1  2f)]}/{2a(2  m)(1  2f)  (2 
andm)[2  m(1  2f)]}
z¯ p 0 (2b)C
if u ≥ {(2  m)[2  m(1  2f)]}/{2a(2  m)(1  2f)  (2 
(see app. C for derivation). This so-m)[2  m(1  2f)]}
lution can be used to calculate the population sex ratio,
. In agreement with¯ ¯z p [ua  (1  u)z ]/[ua  (1  u)]C
Gardner et al. (2012), we find that as the proportion of
unmated queens increases in the population and hence
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Figure 1: Split sex ratios due to queen virginity. The sex ratio (proportion males) is plotted against the proportion of unmated queens (u),
assuming that workers are mated and produce offspring with the same sex ratio as the queen’s offspring ( ) and that a proportionz p zO Q
m of offspring are produced by workers. The figures show the sex ratio in colonies with mated queens (A; zC) and the population sex ratio
(B; ).z¯
reproductive females become rarer, the workers are favored
to produce a lower proportion of males ( ; fig. 1).z¯C
We find that worker reproduction leads to workers fa-
voring higher (fig. 1A). In the absence of worker re-z¯C
production, males may make genetic contributions to the
next generation of reproductive females but do not con-
tribute to the next generation of reproductive males. How-
ever, when workers reproduce, males make larger contri-
butions to the next generation of reproductive females (by
mating with workers, who then produce daughters) and
are also able to contribute to the next generation of re-
productive males (by fathering workers, who then produce
sons; fig. 2). As a consequence, worker reproduction in-
creases the class reproductive value of males and hence
leads selection to favor a higher proportion of males.
In this scenario, the average value that a worker places
on one of her colony’s offspring is z¯ v [(1  m)p C m M
, where pNe is her con-¯mp ]  (1  z )v [(1  m)p  mp ]Ne C f F Ni
sanguinity to a nephew and pNi is her consanguinity to a
niece. As workers produce offspring with the same sex ratio
as their colony, the average value they place on one of their
own offspring is . Hence, the potential¯ ¯z v p  (1  z )v pC m S C f D
for helping is ¯a p {z v [(1  m)p  mp ]  (1 C m M Ne
. We sub-¯ ¯ ¯z )v [(1  m)p  mp ]}/[z v p  (1  z )v p ]C f F Ni C m S C f D
stitute the appropriate reproductive values, consanguinity
coefficients, and sex ratios, giving
(1  u){2  m  [2  (1  m)m]f}[2  m(1  2f)]
a p
4(1  u)(2  m)  8[au(1  m)  m(1  u)]f
(3a)
if u ≤ {(2  m)[2  m(1  2f)]}/{2a(2  m)(1  2f)  (2 
andm)[2  m(1  2f)]}
(2  m)(1  2f)
a p (3b)
4
if u ≥ {(2  m)[2  m(1  2f)]}/{2a(2  m)(1  2f)  (2 
.m)[2  m(1  2f)]}
In the special case where there is no worker reproduction
( ), equation (3) simplifies to equation (5) of Gardnerm p 0
et al. (2012), and we find that haplodiploidy promotes al-
truistic helping in the context of split sex ratios due to queen
virginity and that this effect increases with the proportion
of unmated queens ( and , when ;a 1 1 da/du ≥ 0 m p 0
fig. 3A). Colonies with mated queens are favored to produce
an excess of females (fig. 1A), resulting in split sex ratios
between mated-queen colonies and unmated-queens col-
onies (which produce only males). Consequently, all work-
ers occur only in mated-queen colonies and are able to gain
a relatedness advantage of having a higher proportion of
sisters without this being completely canceled by an equiv-
alent female bias at the population level.
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Figure 2: Worker reproduction and reproductive value. A, In the absence of worker reproduction, a male contributes half the genes of his
diploid daughters but no genes to the haploid males produced by the queen. Thus, the genetic contribution of females to future generations
is twice the contribution of males. B, If workers produce offspring, a male may contribute to the next generation of males through his
grandsons (dashed blue lines). Consequently, worker reproduction increases the relative genetic contribution of males to future generations.
The relative genetic contribution of males to future generations is further increased if the males also mate with workers.
However, when worker reproduction is considered
( ), we find that the potential for helping decreases withm 1 0
increasing worker reproduction ( ; fig. 3A). As theda/dm ≤ 0
proportion of worker reproduction increases in the popu-
lation, the increased reproductive value of males drives an
increase in the colony’s sex ratio (fig. 3A). This results in
a decrease in the relatedness between a worker and the
offspring in her colony, which reduces the potential for
helping. If the rate of worker reproduction is sufficiently
high and queen unmatedness is sufficiently low, then this
can even result in haplodiploidy inhibiting the evolution of
altruistic helping. Specifically, whena ! 1 u ! ({2  m 
/(4  m2  f{4  8a(1 f[2  m(1  m)]}[2  m(1  2f)])
m)  m[8  m(1  m)]}  2mf2[2  m(1  m)]).
The empirical data on levels of virginity in outbreeding
haplodiploid species, consistent with the expected breeding
system of species en route to eusociality, show a range of
with a mode of (Godfray and Hardy0.00 ! u ! 0.06 u p 0
1993; West 2009). Within this range, the potential for help-
ing is maximized when . Focusing on the best-u p 0.06
case scenario of and , we find that hap-u p 0.06 a p 1
lodiploidy actually inhibits the evolution of altruistic
helping if the extent of worker reproduction exceeds
(fig. 3A). However, we might expect levels ofm ≈ 0.11
virginity to be lower in social species (lower u) because
there will be selection to avoid the large cost associated
with not being able to produce workers. Workerless col-
onies are also expected to have lower productivity (lower
a). Both effects will act to further decrease the potential
for altruistic helping.
Unmated Workers
We now assume that workers are unmated. In this case,
the workers produce a proportion m of the colony’s off-
spring, and these worker-derived offspring are all males
( ). The remaining proportion of the colony’sz p 1 1  mO
offspring are queen derived, and the workers set the sex
ratio of these offspring to zM. Thus, from the point of view
of a random worker, the colony offspring is composed of
brothers, sisters, and m nephews(1  m)z (1  m)(1  z )M M
(recall that each worker’s own offspring represents a neg-
ligible fraction of the colony’s brood).
We find that the convergence stable sex ratio strategy
of workers for the queen-derived offspring within colonies
with workers is given by
(2  3m  2mf)(1  u)  2au(1  2f)
z¯ p (4a)M 4(1  u)(1  m)(1  f)
if andu ≤ [2  m(3  2f)]/[2  2a(1  2f)  m(3  2f)]
z¯ p 0 (4b)M
if (seeu ≥ [2  m(3  2f)]/[2  2a(1  2f)  m(3  2f)]
app. C for derivation). This solution can be used to cal-
culate the colony’s sex ratio and the¯ ¯z p m  (1  m)zC M
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Figure 3: Potential for helping with queen virginity. The potential for helping (a) is plotted against the proportion of unmated queens
(u), assuming that a proportion m of offspring are produced by workers. The figures show the scenarios where workers are mated and
produce offspring with the same sex ratio as the queen’s offspring (A; ) and workers are unmated and produce only sons (B;z p zO Q
). In both cases we consider the best-case scenario of equal productivity among colonies ( ) and strict monogamy ( ).z p 1 a p 1 f p 1O
The shaded area shows the empirical range found for the rate of unmated queens in natural populations ( ).0 ! u ! 0.06
population sex ratio z¯ p [au  (1  u)z (1  m) M
. Both queen virginity and unmatedm]/[1  (1  a)u]
worker reproduction increase the proportion of males in
the population, and, as a result, workers are favored to
bias the sex ratio of queen-derived offspring toward fe-
males ( and ; fig. E1; figs. E1, E2¯ ¯dz /du ≤ 0 dz /dm ≤ 0M M
available online).
In this scenario, the average value that a worker places
on one of the colony’s offspring is m¯v p  (1 m Ne
. As workers are unmated, they¯ ¯m)[z v p  (1  z )v p ]M m M M f F
may produce only sons ( ) and so the value thez p 1O
worker places on one of her own offspring is . Hence,v pm S
the potential for helping is a p {mv p  (1 m Ne
. Substituting the appro-¯ ¯m)[z v p  (1  z )v p ]}/v pM m M m f F m S
priate reproductive values, consanguinity coefficients, and
sex ratios, this is
2  m(1  2f)
a p (5a)
4
if andu ≤ [2  m(3  2f)]/[2  2a(1  2f)  m(3  2f)]
[au  m(1  u)](1  2f)
a p (5b)
2(1  u)
if .u ≥ [2  m(3  2f)]/[2  2a(1  2f)  m(3  2f)]
We find that when workers are unmated and hence
constrained to produce only male offspring ( ), hap-z p 1O
lodiploidy inhibits the evolution of eusociality at low to
medium rates of queen virginity, even when worker re-
production is negligible (fig. 3B). Specifically, whena ! 1
(fig. 3B).u ! [2  m(1  2f)]/[2  m(1  2f)  a(1  2f)]
This is because the overall population sex ratio is female
biased, which increases the reproductive value of males
relative to that of females. Consequently, this leads to sce-
narios where sons are worth more to a worker than a
female-biased mixture of siblings ( ).a ! 1
We also find that higher rates of worker reproduction
promote the evolution of helping ( ; fig. 3B). Thisda/dm ≥ 0
is in the direction opposite to what we found when workers
produced offspring of both sexes (fig. 3B). The reason for
this difference is that an increase in the rate of worker
reproduction increases the population sex ratio when work-
ers can produce only sons, which increases the reproductive
value of females. This increases the value of a mixture of
sisters, brothers, and nephews relative to that of sons.
As the rates of worker reproduction (m) and queen vir-
ginity (u) increase, this eventually leads to a male-biased
population sex ratio, which decreases the value of sons, such
that their relative value drops below that of a mixture of
siblings and nephews. When this happens, haplodiploidy
acts to promote the evolution of helping ( ; fig. 1B).a 1 0
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If we consider the high end of the observed empirical range,
with 6% virgin queens ( ), we find that haplodip-u p 0.06
loidy promotes the evolution of altruistic helping only if
the extent of worker reproduction exceeds (fig.m ≈ 0.60
1B), which is much higher than the mean observed in em-
pirical studies ( ; Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2006).m ≈ 0.12
Queen Replacement
We now investigate the impact of haplodiploidy on the
potential for altruistic helping in the context of split sex
ratios due to queen replacement. We consider a population
composed of a large number of colonies, each founded by
a single queen. We assume that a proportion q of colonies
are headed by their original queen (“queenright”), whose
reproductive offspring have a sex ratio of zR. The remaining
proportion of colonies are headed by a replacement1  q
queen (“queenless”), who is a daughter of the original
queen and a sister of the colony’s workers and whose
offspring have a sex ratio of zL.
In this model, workers may find themselves in two dif-
ferent types of colony—queenless versus queenright—so we
may usefully draw a distinction between obligate helping,
which is expressed at the same level in both colonies, and
facultative helping, which is restricted to one type of colony
only. If helping is facultative, it is more likely to be favored
in queenright colonies, as these will tend to have a relatively
greater female bias in their sex ratios (Gardner et al. 2012).
Hence, when considering facultative helping, we will restrict
attention to helping in queenright colonies.
Mated Workers
We extend the queen replacement model presented by
Gardner et al. (2012) by allowing workers to produce a
significant share of the colony offspring. We assume that
workers are mated by unrelated males from their fathers’
generation and that their offspring have the same sex ratio
as the queen-derived offspring in their colony ( ).z p zO C
We find that the joint convergence sex ratios for queenright
( ) and queenless ( ) colonies are¯ ¯z zR L
3  q(1  u)
¯ ¯(z , z ) p 0, (6a)R L ( )4(1  q)
if ,q ≤ 1/(3  m)
¯ ¯(z , z ) p (0, 1) (6b)R L
if 1/(3  m) ≤ q ≤ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1 
, andm)(1  2f)]
(2  m)[1  q(3  m)]  2{2  m  q[2  (1  m)m]f}
¯ ¯(z , z ) p , 1R L ( )4q{2  m  [2  (1  m)m]f}
(6c)
if (seeq ≥ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1  m)(1  2f)]
app. D for derivation). This solution can be used to cal-
culate the population sex ratio , with¯ ¯ ¯z p qz  (1  q)zR L
worker reproduction leading again to a higher proportion
of males (fig. 4).
If helping is a facultative trait, expressed only in queen-
right colonies, the average value that a worker places on
one of the queenright colony’s offspring is [mpNe z¯ vR m
(1  m)pM]  (1  ) [mpNi  (1  m)pF], and thez¯ vR f
average value she places on one of her own offspring is
pS  (1  ) pD. The potential for helping is a p¯ ¯z v z vR m R f
{ [mpNe  (1  m)pM]  (1  ) [mpNi  (1  m)pF]}/¯ ¯z v z vR m R f
[ pS  (1  pD)]. Substituting the appropriate re-¯ ¯z v z vR m R f
productive values, consanguinity coefficients, and sex ra-
tios, this gives
(2  m)(1  2f)
a p (7a)
4
if andq ≤ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1  m)(1  2f)]
q{2  m  [2  (1  m)m]f}[2  m(1  2f)]
a p (7b)
4q[2  m(1  f)  f]  4(1  m)f
if .q ≥ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1  m)(1  2f)]
Considering the facultative helping scenario with neg-
ligible worker reproduction ( ), we recover Gardnerm p 0
et al.’s (2012) result that haplodiploidy always promotes
facultative helping. However, as we increase the level of
worker reproduction, we find that this decreases the extent
to which facultative helping is promoted ( ) andda/dm ≤ 0
even leads to facultative helping being inhibited ( ;a ! 1
fig. 5A). The reason for this is that worker reproduction
(1) increases the relative reproductive value of males (fig.
2) and (2) decreases the relative relatedness of the workers
to the mixture of siblings and nephews that they could
help to rear. Both of these factors reduce the value of
helping relative to rearing their own offspring.
The potential for facultative helping also increases with
the proportion of colonies where the queen is replaced
( ). Specifically, for relatively lower frequency ofda/dq ≤ 0
queen replacement (if q 1 [(2  m)(1  2f)]/[6  4f 
), helping can be promoted by haplo-m(1  m)(1  2f)]
diploidy (if ). The reason for thism ! 2(2f  1)/(1  2f)
is that queenless colonies produce a relatively male-biased
sex ratio, which increases the relative reproductive value
of females and hence increases the value of a female-biased
brood of siblings in the queenright colonies. If the fre-
quency of queen replacement is higher (if q ! [(2 
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Figure 4: Split sex ratios due to queen replacement. The sex ratio
(proportion males) is plotted against the proportion of queenright
colonies (q), assuming that workers are mated and produce offspring
with the same sex ratio as the queen’s offspring ( ) and thatz p zO Q
a proportion m of offspring are produced by workers. The figures
show the sex ratios in queenright colonies (A; zR), queenless colonies
(B; zL), and the overall population (C; ).z¯
), it no longer af-m)(1  2f)]/[6  4f  m(1  m)(1  2f)]
fects the potential for helping (a), which decreases with
worker reproduction ( if ).a 1 1 m ! 2(2f  1)/(1  2f)
A small number of empirical studies on primitive eu-
social bees have estimated that levels of queen replacement
are between 20% and 40% ( , ) in spe-0.6 ≤ q ≤ 0.8 n p 3
cies with split sex ratios due to queen replacement (Packer
1986; Yanega 1989; Mueller 1991). However, at low rates
of queen replacement, it could be hard to observe both
queen replacement and the subsequent split sex ratios, and
so we consider the range of 0%–40% queen replacement
( ; Chapuisat and Keller 1999; Meunier et al.0.6 ≤ q ≤ 1
2008; West 2009). In the best-case scenario for the evo-
lution of eusociality, with queen replacement at 40%
( ), we find that haplodiploidy inhibits the evolu-q p 0.6
tion of facultative altruistic helping whenever the extent
of worker reproduction exceeds (fig. 5A).m ≈ 0.4
We now consider the evolution of obligate helping, ex-
pressed equally by workers in queenright and queenless
workers. In this case, the average value that a worker places
on one of her colony’s offspring is q{ [mpNe  (1  m)z¯ vR m
pM]  (1  ) [mpNi  (1  m)pF]}  (1  q)[ pNe ¯ ¯z v z vR f L m
(1  ) pNi], and the average value she places on one ofz¯ vL f
her own offspring is q[ pS  (1  ) pD]  (1 ¯ ¯z v z vR m R f
q)[ pS  (1  ) pD]. Thus, the potential for helping¯ ¯z v z vL m L f
is a p (q{ [mpNe  (1  m)pM]  (1  ) [mpNi  (1 ¯ ¯z v z vR m R f
m)pF]}  (1  q)[ pNe  (1  ) pNi])/{q[ pS  (1¯ ¯ ¯z v z v z vL m L f R m
 ) pD]  (1  q)[ pS  (1  ) pD]}. Substituting¯ ¯ ¯z v z v z vR f L m L f
the appropriate reproductive values, consanguinity coef-
ficients, and sex ratios, this gives
[1  q(1  m)](1  2f)
a p (8a)
4
if ,q ≤ 1/(3  m)
1  2f
a p (8b)
3  m
if 1/(3  m) ≤ q ≤ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1 
, andm)(1  2f)]
{2  m  [2  (1  m)m]f}[1  2f  q(1  m)(1  2f)]
a p (8c)
24{2  m(1  mf)  [1  q(1  m) ]f}
if .q ≥ [(1  2f)(2  m)]/[6  4f  m(1  m)(1  2f)]
In the case of no worker reproduction ( ), wem p 0
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Figure 5: Potential for helping in the queen replacement model with mated workers. The potential for helping (a) is plotted against the
proportion of queenright colonies (q), assuming that workers are mated and produce offspring with the same sex ratio as the queen’s
offspring ( ) and that a proportion m of offspring are produced by workers. The figures show the potential for facultative helpingz p zO Q
given only in queenright colonies (A) and obligate helping given at both queenright and queenless colonies (B). The shaded area shows
the empirical range observed in natural populations ( ).0.6 ! q ! 1
recover Gardner et al.’s (2012) result that haplodiploidy
has no influence on the evolution of obligate helping
( ) when the rate of queen replacement is lowa p 1
( ) and inhibits the evolution of obligate helpingq 1 0.67
( ) at higher levels of queen replacement ( ;a ! 1 q ! 0.67
fig. 5B). As the rate of worker reproduction increases
( ), this increases the relative reproductive value ofm 1 0
males (fig. 2) and leads to workers rearing a higher pro-
portion of worker-derived offspring. Both of these factors
increase the sex ratio among the offspring that the workers
help to rear (fig. 4). All of these factors decrease the average
relatedness between a worker and her colony’s offspring
and hence decrease the potential for helping (fig. 5B).
As worker reproduction increases, this decreases the ex-
tent to which haplodiploidy promotes the evolution of
obligate helping ( ; fig. 5B). Indeed, if workerda/dm ≤ 0
reproduction is nonnegligible, then obligate helping is al-
ways inhibited by haplodiploidy ( if ; fig. 5B).a ! 1 m 1 0
The reason for this, as discussed above, is that worker
reproduction increases the relative reproductive value of
males and hence decreases the relative relatedness to the
offspring (siblings and nephews) that the worker could
help to rear.
Unmated Workers
We now consider the consequences of reproductive work-
ers being unmated. All our assumptions are the same as
in the worker reproduction model, except that the worker-
derived offspring are all males ( ). We find that thez p 1O
joint convergence stable sex ratio strategy for queenright
( ) and queenless ( ) colonies is given by¯ ¯z zR L
3  q(1  m)  4m 1
0, q ≤( )4(1  q)(1  m) 3(1  m)
1 1  2f
¯ ¯(z , z ) p (0, 1) if ≤ q ≤ (9a)R L
3(1  m) (1  m)(3  2f){ q(1  m)(3  2f)  2f  1 1  2f
, 1 q ≥( )4q(1  m)(1  f) (1  m)(3  2f)
when and bym ≤ (3  q)/(4  q)
¯ ¯(z , z ) p (0, 0) (9b)R L
when (see app. D for derivation). Thism ≥ (3  q)/(4  q)
solution can be used to calculate the population sex ratio
. Both queen replacement¯ ¯ ¯z p m  (1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ]R L
and worker reproduction increase the population sex ratio.
As a result, workers from both queenright and queenless
colonies are selected to bias the sex ratio of queen-derived
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Figure 6: Potential for helping in the queen replacement model with unmated workers. The potential for helping (a) is plotted against
the proportion of queenright colonies (q), assuming that workers are unmated and produce only sons ( ) and that a proportion mz p 1O
of offspring are produced by workers. The figures show the potential for facultative helping given only in queenright colonies (A) and
obligate helping given at both queenright and queenless colonies (B). The shaded area shows the empirical range observed in natural
populations ( ).0.6 ! q ! 1
offspring toward the production of females ( and¯dz /dq ≥ 0R
and ; fig. E2).¯ ¯dz /dm ≤ 0 dz /du ≤ 0R L
If helping is a facultative trait, expressed only in queen-
right colonies, the average value that a worker places on
one of the colony’s offspring is mv p  (1 m Ne
, and the average value that she¯ ¯m)[z v p  (1  z )v p ]R m M R f F
places on one of her own offspring is . Thus, thev pm S
potential for helping is a p { [mpNe  (1  m)pM] z¯ vR M
(1  ) [mpNi  (1  m)pF]}/[ pS  (1  ) pD].¯ ¯ ¯z v z v z vR f R m R f
Substituting the appropriate reproductive values, consan-
guinity coefficients, and sex ratios, we obtain
(2  m)(1  2f) 1
q ≤
4 3(1  m)
[1  q(1  2m)](1  2f) 1 1  2f
a p if ≤ q ≤
4q 3(1  m) (1  m)(3  2f){2  m(1  2f) 1  2f
q ≥
4 (1  m)(3  2f)
(10a)
when andm ≤ (3  q)/(4  q)
(5  q)m(1  2f)
a p (10b)
4(3  q)
when . If the extent of worker repro-m ≥ (3  q)/(4  q)
duction is negligible ( ), haplodiploidy promotes fac-m ≈ 0
ultative helping only if the frequency of queen replacement
is sufficiently high ( ; fig. 6A). This re-q ! (1  2f)/(5  2f)
sult differs from that of Gardner et al. (2012), who showed
that haplodiploidy always promotes facultative helping. This
difference stems from us considering that workers produce
only sons rather than a mixture of sons and daughters in
the same ratio as the offspring of the queen. In a population
where workers control colony sex ratio and the proportion
of queenright colonies is high (large q), the population sex
ratio is female biased, which increases the reproductive value
of males. Consequently, sons are worth more than a mixture
of sons and daughters. If we consider a monogamous pop-
ulation and the empirically estimated range of rates of queen
replacement ( ), helping is never promoted in0.6 ≤ q ≤ 1
this scenario (fig. 6A).
As the rate of worker reproduction increases, the pa-
rameter range over which facultative helping is promoted
by haplodiploidy becomes larger (fig. 6A; ifa 1 1 q !
and(1  2f)/[5  2m(1  2f)  2f] 0 ! m ! (3  q)/(4 
). The reason for this is that worker reproduction de-q)
creases the relative reproductive value of males (fig. 2) and
hence reduces the relative value of producing sons. As the
proportion of worker-derived offspring increases to very
high levels ( ), the population sex ratiom 1 (3  q)/(4  q)
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becomes increasingly male biased and the rare-sex effect
means that the inclusive fitness value of a worker’s own
offspring (a son) is lower than that of a random juvenile
in the worker’s colony (which is composed of both male
and female offspring). Thus, helping is promoted by hap-
lodiploidy, with the potential for helping increasing with
both the proportion of queen survival and the proportion
of worker reproduction ( ifa 1 1 q 1 [12  5m(1 
). Considering the best-case scenario2f)]/[4  m(1  2f)]
of , facultative helping is promoted if the pro-q p 0.6
portion of worker reproduction exceeds (fig. 3A).m ≈ 0.33
If helping is an obligate trait, expressed equally by workers
in queenright and queenless colonies, the average value a
worker places on one of the colony’s offspring is m pNe vm
(1  m){q[ pM  (1  ) pF]  (1  q)[ pNe ¯ ¯ ¯z v z v z vR m R f L m
(1  ) pNi]}, and the average value she places on her ownz¯ vL f
offspring is pS. Thus, the potential for helping is a pvm
(m pNe  (1  m){q[ pM  (1  ) pF]  (1 ¯ ¯v z v z vm R m R f
q)[ pNe  (1  ) pNi]})/( pS). Substituting the ap-¯ ¯z v z v vL m L f m
propriate reproductive values, consanguinity coefficients,
and sex ratios, this gives
[1  q(1  m)](1  2f) 1
q ≤
4 3(1  m)
[1  q(1  m)](1  2f) 1 1  2f
a p if ≤ q ≤
2 3(1  m) (1  m)(3  2f){1  2f  q(1  m)(1  2f) 1  2f
q ≥
4 (1  m)(3  2f)
(11a)
when andm ≤ (3  q)/(4  q)
m(1  2f)
a p (11b)
3  q
when . We find that obligate helping ism ≥ (3  q)/(4  q)
inhibited by haplodiploidy ( ), except when the fre-a ! 1
quency of worker reproduction is very high ( whena 1 1
; fig. 6B). Again, this corresponds to aq 1 3  m(1  2f)
male bias in sex allocation at the population level, which
decreases the relative reproductive of males and hence re-
duces the value of producing sons. For example, assuming
, obligate helping is promoted by haplodiploidyq p 0.8
only if the proportion of worker-laid offspring exceeds
.m ≈ 0.73
Discussion
We have quantified the effect of haplodiploidy on the evo-
lution of helping, in the context of split sex ratios that
arise owing to queen virginity or queen replacement. We
have found that worker reproduction, especially when
workers are constrained to produce only sons, has a neg-
ative influence on the evolution of helping (lower a), ei-
ther reducing the extent to which it is promoted or even
leading to it being inhibited. Considering queen virginity,
we expect the influence of haplodiploidy on the evolution
of helping to be a slight promotion, a slight inhibition, or
a strong inhibition ( ; fig. 3). Considering0.5 ! a ! 1.068
queen replacement, we expect the influence of haplodip-
loidy on the evolution of helping to be (a) positive or
negative for facultative helping ( ; figs. 5A, 6A)0.5 ! a ! 1.5
or (b) slightly or strongly inhibitive for obligate helping
( ; figs. 5B, 6B).0.5 ! a ! 1
Worker Reproduction and Unmated Workers
We found that increasing the level of worker reproduction
tends to reduce the extent to which haplodiploidy pro-
motes the evolution of helping and can even lead to hap-
lodiploidy inhibiting the evolution of helping (figs. 3, 5,
6). This arises for two reasons. First, because brothers and
sisters are replaced with nephews and nieces, this decreases
the relatedness between workers and the offspring that they
could help to raise in their colony. Second, the increased
reproductive value of males (fig. 2; Trivers and Hare 1976;
Pamilo 1991; Gardner et al. 2012) and equal relatedness
to nephews and nieces both lead to workers being favored
to bring about a higher proportion of males in the brood
that they help to raise (higher zC). This also reduces the
relatedness between potential workers and the offspring
that they could help to raise. Empirical data from the social
Hymenoptera suggest that the proportion of offspring pro-
duced by workers ranges from 0% to 100%, with an av-
erage of 12% (Ratnieks et al. 2006; Wenseleers and Rat-
nieks 2006).
We found that constraining workers to produce only
male offspring leads to haplodiploidy having a strong in-
hibitory affect on the evolution of helping. The reason for
this is that when workers control the sex allocation of their
colonies, the population sex ratio tends to be female biased
(figs. 1, 4, E1, E2), which increases the relative reproductive
value of males. Consequently, helping is relatively inhibited
when the offspring of workers contain a higher proportion
of males. Worker reproduction being constrained to only
males also means that workers would be helping to rear
only nephews within a colony and not nieces, which has
implications for relatedness and reproductive value, but
these effects are smaller. Empirical data from the social
hymenoptera suggest that in many of the cases where
workers reproduce, they are constrained to produce only
males (Ratnieks et al. 2006; Wenseleers and Ratnieks 2006).
Whenever this is the case, we predict that haplodiploidy
will inhibit the evolution of helping and that this affect
will be relatively strong, with (figs. 3B, 6).a ≈ 0.5
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Haplodiploidy and the Evolution of Eusociality
We have shown that there are only two scenarios that could
have possibly led to nontransient split sex ratios en route
to eusociality: queen virginity and queen replacement
(Gardner et al. 2012). In the above sections and figures 3,
5, and 6, we have used the empirical data to parameterize
these models and estimate the range of possible conse-
quences. We now condense this information to provide an
overall estimate of the influence of these two scenarios.
Considering queen virginity, levels of unmatedness in out-
breeding Hymenoptera species are in the range 0%–6%,
with a mode of 0%. Assuming a virginity rate of 3%
( ) and that workers produce 12% of offspringu p 0.03
( ), we predict that haplodiploidy will inhibit ratherm p 0.12
than promote the evolution of helping. This inhibition will
be weak when workers produce both sons and daughters
( ) and strong when workers are constrained to pro-a ≈ 0.97
duce only sons ( ). These predictions assume thata ≈ 0.53
colonies without helpers are as productive as colonies with
helpers ( ). If colonies without helpers are less pro-a p 1
ductive ( ), then this effectively reduces the extent toa ! 1
which sex ratios are split and leads to a lower potential for
helping (lower a; Gardner et al. 2012).
Queen replacement occurs in 0%–40% of colonies
(Packer 1986; Yanega 1989; Mueller 1991). Assuming a
replacement rate of 20% ( ) and that workers pro-q p 0.8
duce 12% of offspring, we predict that haplodiploidy will
inhibit the evolution of obligate helping but will either
slightly promote or slightly or strongly inhibit the evo-
lution of facultative helping. Facultative helping will be
slightly promoted when workers produce sons and daugh-
ters ( ) but strongly inhibited when workers area ≈ 1.05
constrained to produce only sons ( ). Obligate help-a ≈ 0.5
ing will be slightly inhibited when workers produce sons
and daughters ( ) but strongly inhibited whena ≈ 0.95
workers are constrained to produce only sons ( ).a ≈ 0.5
Overall, our results suggest that split sex ratios are un-
likely to have led to haplodiploidy promoting the evolution
of eusociality. Our empirically parameterized predictions
suggest that the influence of split sex ratios is likely to
have been minor and may have actually inhibited rather
than promoted the evolution of eusociality. Furthermore,
split sex ratios due to either queen virginity or queen
replacement are very rare. Consequently, the most com-
mon scenario is that in which neither occurs ( ,u ≈ 0
), in which case haplodiploidy has no effect (q ≈ 1 a ≈ 1
or with worker reproduction) if workers can pro-a ! 1
duce sons and daughters or is strongly inhibitory if work-
ers are constrained to produce only sons ( ). Triversa ≈ 0.5
and Hare (1976) also suggested that split sex ratios could
arise transiently as worker control spreads through the
population. We have analyzed this scenario elsewhere and
concluded that it is unlikely to have had a major influence
on the evolution of eusociality (J. Alpedrinha, A. Gardner,
and S. A. West, unpublished manuscript).
More generally, our results support the argument that
from the perspective of how relatedness influences the
evolution of eusociality, the most important factor is mo-
nogamy and not haplodiploidy (Boomsma 2007, 2009;
Hughes et al. 2008; West and Gardner 2010). In species
with strict lifetime monogamy, potential helpers are as
related to the siblings that they could help to raise as they
are to their own offspring. Consequently, only a small
economic (ecological) benefit to cooperation is required
for helping to be favored (Boomsma 2007). Consistent
with this, eusociality has evolved only in species with strict
lifetime monogamy (Hughes et al. 2008; Cornwallis et al.
2010) and where there is some ecological benefit to co-
operation, which tends to be associated with extended pa-
rental care or fortress defence (Queller and Strassmann
1998; Davies et al. 2012).
Acknowledgments
Our work on haplodiploidy and the evolution of euso-
ciality was inspired by questions from J. Boomsma at the
“Evolution of Societies” meeting held by the Royal Society
in 2009. We thank A. Grafen, I. Pen, and two reviewers
for comments on the manuscript and the European Re-
search Council, the Royal Society, and Balliol College for
funding.
APPENDIX A
Reproductive Value
Reproductive value describes the expected contribution of
genes made by an individual or class of individuals to a
generation in the distant future (Fisher 1930; Taylor 1996;
Gardner et al. 2012). Reproductive value may first be cal-
culated for a class and then shared equally by all the in-
dividuals of that class, that is, , where is thev p c /N vj j j j
individual reproductive value, cj the class reproductive
value, and Nj the number of individuals from that class
in the population. More generally, we may scale individual
class reproductive values by any constant, without im-
pacting our key predictions. In our models, we define two
classes of reproductive (as opposed to worker) individuals:
males and females. Male class reproductive value, cm, is
the probability that a gene picked at random in a distant
generation descends from a male ancestor in the present
generation. If we multiply all individual reproductive val-
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ues by the total number of individuals in the population,
we obtain , where is the population sex ratio.¯ ¯v p c /z zm m
Similarly, we define female class reproductive value as
.¯v p c /(1  z)f f
We now derive the class reproductive values for males
and females for a haplodiploid population, allowing for
worker reproduction and queen replacement. We census
the population at the moment that reproductive offspring
are produced and following sex allocation decision (for
details on sex allocation decision, see apps. C, D). Only
reproductive larvae are included in the census (all other
individuals in the population are adults at this time). The
proportion of genes in female larvae at the time of census
that derive from the females at the last census is P pfRf
, where is the probability of picking(1/2)z  (1/4)z zQ, f w, f Q, f
at random from the whole female population a larvae that
is queen derived and is the probability of picking atzW, f
random from the whole female population a larvae that
is worker derived (notice that ). That is,z p 1  zQ, f W, f
with probability the larva is queen derived and hencezQ, f
a proportion 1/2 of her genes descend from a female from
the previous census (i.e., her mother, the queen), and with
probability the larva is worker derived and hence azW, f
proportion 1/4 of her genes descend from a female from
the previous census (i.e., half derive from her mother, a
worker, who derives half of her genes from the queen).
Thus, the proportion of genes in female larvae at the time
of census that derive from males in the previous census
is . The proportion of genes in male larvaeP p 1  PfRm fRf
at the time of census that derived from females in the
previous census is , where isP p z  (1/2)z zmRf Q, m W, m Q, m
the probability of picking at random from the whole pop-
ulation a queen-derived male and is the probabilityzW, m
of picking at random from the whole population a worker-
derived male. Thus, the proportion of genes in male larvae
at the time of census that derived from males in the pre-
vious census is .P p 1  PmRm frm
The class reproductive values are given by the dominant
left eigenvector of the gene-flow matrix, that is, the so-
lution to (Taylor 1996; Frank 1998),(c c ) p (c c ) 7 Mf m f m
where M is
P PfRf fRmM p . (A1)[ ]P PmRf mRm
Thus, we solve the system of equations c p P c f fRf f
and .P c c p P c  P cmRf m m fRm f mRm m
Queen Virginity
If we pick a male at random from the population after
the sex allocation culling, the probability that his mother
was a queen rather than a worker is z p [ua  (1 Q, m
. If weu)(1  m)z ]/[ua  (1  u)(1  m)z  (1  u)z ]M M O
pick a female at random from the population after the sex
allocation culling, the probability that her mother was a
queen rather than a worker is z p (1  u)(1  m)(1 Q, f
. If we pick az )/{(1  u)[(1  m)(1  z )  m(1  z )]}M M O
male at random from the population after the sex allo-
cation culling, the probability that his mother was a worker
rather than a queen is , and if we pick az p 1  zW, m Q, m
female at random from the population after the sex al-
location culling, the probability that her mother was a
worker rather than a queen is .z p 1  zW, f Q, f
Substituting these in matrix M and solving (c c ) pf m
gives the class reproductive values(c c ) 7 Mf m
1
c p (2[1  z (1  m)  z m]f M O
W
# {2au  (1  u)[2z (1  m)  z m]}), (A2)M O
1
c p [2  2z (1  m)  m(1  3z )]m M O
W
# {au  (1  u)[z (1  m)  z m]}, (A3)M O
where W p au(6[1  zM(1  m)  m(1  7zO)]  (1 
u)[6z2M(1  m)
2  zOm(4  m  5zOm)]  zM(1  m)
(6  m  11zOm).
Queen Replacement
If we pick a male at random from the population after
the sex allocation culling, the probability that his mother
was a queen rather than a worker is z p (1 Q, m
. If we pick a fe-m)qz /{(1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  mz }R R L O
male at random from the population after the sex allo-
cation culling, the probability that her mother was a queen
rather than a worker is z p (1  m)q(1  z )/{(1 Q, f R
. If we pick a male at ran-m)[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )]}R L
dom from the population after the sex allocation culling,
the probability that his mother was a worker rather than
a queen is , and if we pick a female atz p 1  zW, m Q, m
random from the population after the sex allocation cull-
ing, the probability that her mother was a worker rather
than a queen is .z p 1  zW, f Q, f
Substituting these in matrix M and solving (c c ) pf m
gives the class reproductive values(c c ) 7 Mf m
1
c p 2({[(1  q)z  2qz ](1  m)  z m}f L R O
Q
# [(1  q)z  qz ](1  m)  z m  1), (A4)L R O
1
c p ([3z  q(1  3z  2z )(1  m)  3(z  z )m  3]m L L R O L
Q
# {qz (1  m)  z m  z [1  q(1  m)]}), (A5)R O L
This content downloaded from 138.251.162.242 on Fri, 8 Aug 2014 07:52:30 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Haplodiploidy and Eusociality 435
where Q p 5(1  q)2zL
2(1  m)2  q2zR(1  6zR)(1  m)
2 
(1  q)zL(1  m)[5  q(1  11zR)(1  m) – 10zOm] 
5zOm(1  zOm)  q(1  m)(7zR  zOm  11zOzRm).
APPENDIX B
Genetic Associations
Consanguinity
The coefficient of consanguinity pij between two individ-
uals, i and j, describes the probability that a gene drawn
at random from individual i is identical by descent to a
gene drawn at random from individual j (Bulmer 1994).
Due to the haplodiploid genetics, the consanguinity of a
male to himself is different from the consanguinity of a
female to herself. Assuming outbreeding, the consanguin-
ity of a (diploid) female to herself is . The con-p p 1/2FF
sanguinity of a (haploid) male to himself is . Thep p 1MM
consanguinity of two maternal sisters is given by the prob-
ability 1/4 of drawing their two maternal genes, times the
consanguinity 1/2 of their mother to herself, plus the prob-
ability 1/4 of drawing their two paternal genes, times the
probability f that they share the same father, times the
consanguinity 1 of their father to himself, that is, p pF
. The consanguinity between opposite-sex sib-(1  2f)/8
lings is the probability 1/2 of drawing their two maternal
genes times the consanguinity 1/2 of the mother to herself,
that is, . The consanguinity between mother andp p 1/4M
daughter is given by the probability 1/2 of drawing the
maternal gene from the daughter times the consanguinity
1/2 of the mother to herself, that is, . The con-p p 1/4D
sanguinity between mother and son is given by the prob-
ability 1 of drawing the maternal gene from the son times
the consanguinity 1/2 of the mother to herself, that is,
. The consanguinity between aunt and niece isp p 1/2S
given by the consanguinity between two ma-(1  2f)/8
ternal sisters times the probability 1/2 of drawing the ma-
ternal gene from the niece, that is, .p p (1  2f)/16Ni
Equally, the consanguinity between aunt and nephew is
given by the consanguinity between two ma-(1  2f)/8
ternal sisters times the probability 1 of drawing the ma-
ternal gene from the nephew, that is, .p p (1  2f)/8Ne
APPENDIX C
Queen Virginity
Here we derive the convergence stable sex ratio strategies
(Taylor 1996) for the queen virginity models.
Mated Workers
We determine sex allocation the following way: we assume
that the queen produces sons andN(1  m) N(1  m)
daughters and the workers decide which half of these to
raise, giving queen-derived offspring in total,N(1  m)
with sex ratio zM. Thus, there will be male and(1  m)Nz M
female queen-derived offspring devel-(1  m)N(1  z )M
oping to reproductive maturity, where m is the proportion
of worker reproduction in the colony and zM is the sex
ratio followed for queen-derived offspring. If workers are
limited to produce sons, then they produce mN males. If
they produce offspring of both sexes, we assume that they
produce N sons and N daughters, of which only mN sur-
vive. Hence, there will be mNzO male and fe-mN(1  z )O
male worker-derived offspring developing to reproductive
maturity, where zW is the sex ratio followed for worker-
derived offspring. We assume that workers are limited to
produce the same sex ratio as queen-derived offspring,
and thus .z p zO M
The fitness of a queen-derived female is the probability
that she will be reared to maturity, which is (1  m)(1 
; the average fitness of her class is ; and,¯z ) (1  m)(1  z )M M
thus, her relative fitness is W p [(1  m)(1  z )]/[(1 f M
. The probability of survival of a male is found¯m)(1  z )]M
in a similar way, and the relative fitness of a male egg
is .¯W p [(1  u)(1  m)z  ua]/[(1  u)(1  m)z  ua]f M M
Natural selection favors the increase of a trait in the pop-
ulation if individuals carrying genes for that trait are on
average fitter than the population average. If we consider
that a gene G with genic value g affects the sex allocation
strategy of the individuals carrying it, G is favored if
. Hence, the marginal fitness of G is given bydW/dg 1 0
dW dW dWf mp c  cf mdg dg dg
ˆ ˆW dz dg W dz dgf M m Mp c  c , (C1)f m
ˆ ˆz dg dg z dg dgM f M m
where is the genotype-phenotype map,ˆdz /dg p 1M
is the coefficient of consan-ˆdg/dg p mp  (1  m)pf Ni F
guinity between a worker and an average female juvenile
in the colony, and is the av-ˆdg/dg p mp  (1  m)pm Ne M
erage consanguinity coefficient between a worker and a
random male juvenile in the colony. Replacing these ex-
pressions with the model parameters allows us to find the
convergence stable sex ratio strategy for mated-queen*z M
colonies.
Unmated Workers
We consider that workers contribute a proportion m of
offspring, and these are all male. They also decide the sex
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ratio of the queen offspring. Thus, there will be1  m
queen sons and queen daughters, fromN(1  m) N(1  m)
which workers choose to raise half, given by sex ratio zM.
Thus, the colony’s offspring are composed of N(1 
queen’s sons, queen’s daughters,m)z N(1  m)(1  z )M M
and Nm workers’ sons.
The fitness of a juvenile female in the population is
given by the probability that she will be reared to maturity,
which is . The average fitness of her class(1  u)(1  z )M
is , and thus, her relative fitness is¯(1  u)(1  z ) W pM f
. The probability of sur-¯[(1  u)(1  z )]/[(1  u)(1  z )]M M
vival of a male is found in a similar way, and the relative
fitness of a male egg is W p {(1  u)[(1  m)z  m] m M
. Natural selection favors the¯ua}/[(1  u)[(1  m)z  ua]}M
increase of a trait in the population if individuals carrying
that trait are on average fitter than the population average.
If we consider that a gene G with genic value g affects the
sex allocation strategy of the individuals carrying it, G is
favored if . We use the procedure described bydW/dg 1 0
equation (C2) to find the marginal fitness equation of zM,
where is the coefficient of consanguinity be-ˆdg/dg p pf F
tween sisters and is the average coefficientˆdg/dg p pm M
of consanguinity between a random male juvenile in the
colony and a worker. Replacing these expressions by the
model parameters allows us to find the convergence stable
sex ratio strategy for mated-queen colonies.
APPENDIX D
Queen Replacement
Mated Workers
The fitness of a juvenile queenright colony male is defined
as the probability of a male to survive, that is, (1 
. The average fitness of a male¯m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  mzR L O
is ; thus, the relative fitness¯ ¯ ¯(1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  mzR L O
of a male is W p {(1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ] m R L
. Equally, the fitness¯ ¯ ¯ ¯mz }/{(1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  mz }O R L O
of a juvenile female is (1  m)[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1 R
, the average fitness of a female is¯z )]  m(1  z ) (1 L O
, and, thus, her¯ ¯ ¯m)[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )]  m(1  z )R L O
relative fitness is W p [(1  m)[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1 f R
/ ¯ ¯ ¯z )]  m(1  z )] {(1  m)[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )]L O R L
. Following the same reasoning as in the previous¯m(1  z )}O
section, the average fitness of an individual is W p
, where cm and cf are the male and the femalec W  c Wf f m m
class reproductive values, respectively, derived in appendix
A (Taylor 1996; Taylor and Frank 1996; Frank 1997, 1998;
Rousset 2004; Taylor et al. 2007). Consider a gene H with
genic value h controlling sex allocation in queenright col-
onies. Natural selection favors an increase of frequency of
this trait in the population if . Thus, the mar-dW/dg 1 0
ginal fitness of H is given by
dW dW dWf mp c  cf mdh dh dh
ˆ ˆW dz dh W dz dhf R m Rp c  c , (D1)f mˆ ˆz dh dh z dh dhR f R m
where is the average consan-ˆdg/dg p mp  (1  m)pf Ni F
guinity between a worker and a juvenile female in the
colony and is the average con-ˆdg/dg p mp  (1  m)pm Ne M
sanguinity between a worker and a juvenile male in the
colony.
We use the same rationale to model the action of natural
selection on the sex allocation strategy in queenless col-
onies. In this case, we consider a gene K with genic value
k controlling sex allocation in queenless colonies. Through
natural selection, this trait increases its value in the pop-
ulation if . Hence, the marginal fitness of K isdW/dk 1 0
given by
dW dW dWf mp c  cf mdk dk dk
ˆ ˆW dz dk W dz dkf L m Lp c  c , (D2)f mˆ ˆz dk dk z dk dkL f L m
where and are the coefficientsˆ ˆdh/dh p p dh/dh p pf Ni m Ne
of consanguinity between a worker and her niece and her
nephew, respectively. By replacing in equations (D1) and
(D2) expressions with the model parameters, we find the
joint convergence stable sex ratio strategy for queen-
derived and worker-derived offspring in mated-queen
colonies.
Unmated Workers
We consider that workers produce male offspring by re-
placing m of the queen-derived offspring, in both queenless
and queenright colonies. The fitness of a juvenile queen-
right colony male is defined as the probability of a male
to survive, that is, . The average fitness ofqz  (1  q)zR L
a male is ; thus, the relative fitness of a¯ ¯qz  (1  q)zR L
male is W p {(1  m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  m}/{(1 m R L
. Equally, the fitness of a juvenile¯ ¯m)[qz  (1  q)z ]  m)}R L
female is , the average fitnessq(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )R L
of a female is , and thus, her¯ ¯q(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )R L
relative fitness is W p [q(1  z )  (1  q)(1 f R
. Following the same rea-¯ ¯z )]/[q(1  z )  (1  q)(1  z )]L R L
soning as in the previous section, the average fitness of an
individual is , where cm and cf are theW p c W  c Wf f m m
male and the female class reproductive values, respectively,
derived in appendix A (Taylor 1996; Taylor and Frank
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1996; Frank 1997, 1998; Rousset 2004; Taylor et al. 2007).
Consider a gene G with genic value g controlling sex al-
location in queenright colonies. Natural selection favors
an increase of frequency of this trait in the population if
. We use the procedure described by equationsdW/dg 1 0
(D1) and (D2) to find the marginal fitness equations for
zR and zL. Substituting model parameters in this system of
equations allows us to determine the joint convergence
stable sex ratio strategies. These expressions by the model
parameters allow us to find the convergence stable sex
ratio strategy for mated-queen colonies.
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“The females [left] closely resemble the workers-major [bottom], but are larger, more robust, and in the virgin state are winged. The
males [right] are winged, [and] are smaller than the females, from whom they are further readily distinguished by the smaller head, an
additional segment to the abdomen and the different form of the same. ... [T]hey are referred to in the following notes as Formica exsectoı¨des
Forel, a new American ally of F. exsecta.” From “Mound-Making Ants of the Alleghenies” by Henry C. McCook (American Naturalist, 1878,
12:431–445).
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